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9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 AIDS HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, a
12 California Non-Profit
Corporation,
13
14 Plaintiff,
15 v.
16 GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC, etc., et
al.,
17
18 Defendant.

CV 03-2792 TJH
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN
SUPPORT OF AIDS HEALTHCARE
FOUNDATION'S OPPOSITION TO
GLAXOSMITHKLINE'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
JUDGE TERRY J. HATTER

19 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

20 The State of California places a high value on the
21 preservation of open and competitive markets for prescription
22 drugs. The Attorney General serves as a representative of the
23 public interest, defending the interests of consumers in a variety
24 of contexts, and is responsible to the public for the enforcement
25 of antitrust law. This position of special public trust imposes
26 upon the Attorney General a unique duty to represent the public
27 interest in cases where the resolution of a legal dispute between
28 private parties has important implications for the marketplace and

1 threatens serious harm to open competition and the benefits it
2 provides to consumers. This special public trust encompasses a
3 duty to represent the public interest for all of California's
4 citizens, including the estimated 50,000 Californians living with
5 AIDS.

6 The Attorney General has a particularly compelling interest
7 in this matter because resolution of the issues presented will
8 affect numerous controversies of public importance. The impact
9 of this decision may be wide-ranging. Fair competition law and
10 patent law, in proper balance, both foster innovation. Fair
11 competition law and patent law out of balance may have the
12 perverse effect of thwarting competition.

13 This case arises out of the events surrounding the
14 development, patenting, and commercial production of zidovudine
15 ("AZT") from the 1960's to the present. The parties, a non-
16 profit AIDS service and advocacy organization (the AIDS
17 Healthcare Foundation or "AHF") and a large multi-national
18 pharmaceutical company (GlaxoSmithKline plc or "Glaxo"), both
19 agree that it is the conduct - and the antitrust and patent
20 implications of that conduct—of employees of Burroughs-Welcome
21 Company (Glaxo's predecessor at interest) before the United
22 States Patent and Trademark Office ("the PTO") and the Food and
23 Drug Administration ("FDA") that is the focus of this motion for
24 partial summary judgment.

25 Glaxo maintains that an antitrust claim based on the
26 procurement of patents cannot go forward without a genuine issue
27 of material fact as to fraud, that there is none, and that
28 partial summary judgment should be granted. AHF asserts that the

1 standard for summary judgment has not been met and that there are
2 important disputed material facts. The State of California
3 submits that much of the nominal dispute over material facts is,
4 in fact, a dispute over the legal significance of material
5 omissions before the PTO.

6 The Attorney General of California submits this amicus
7 brief to support the proposition that material omissions from
8 information submitted to the PTO and in supplementary submissions
9 to the Food and Drug Administration's Orange Book ("the Orange
10 Book") may give rise to crucial elements of an antitrust claim.
11 The material omissions at issue in this motion for partial
12 summary judgment are the lynchpins to a powerful antitrust claim.
13 The factual dispute over the characterization of these material
14 omissions - as intentional, grossly negligent, inadvertent error,
15 or honest mistake -- is not appropriately resolved by a summary
16 judgment motion.

17 QUESTION PRESENTED

18 Should this Court grant partial summary judgment on the
19 issue of AZT patent validity when the validity determination
20 turns on factual issues surrounding the nature and content of
21 material omissions from information submitted to the PTO and
22 supplementary submissions to the Orange Book.

23 ARGUMENT

24 Material omissions from information submitted to the PTO and
25 the FDA's Orange Book may give rise to crucial elements of an
26 antitrust claim brought to correct an allegedly anti-competitive
27 market effect resulting from the use of a fraudulently obtained
28 patent to influence the marketplace.

1 Both parties to this litigation advance readings of *Walker*
2 *Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.*, 382
3 U.S. 172 (1965) ("*Walker Process*"). *Walker Process* represents an
4 exception to the general immunity from antitrust prosecution a
5 patent holder enjoys and is invoked here by AHF. The exemption
6 developed out of the recognition that the integrity of the patent
7 system depends upon the candor of the patent applicant.

8 Although "[t]he patent fraud proscribed by *Walker* is
9 extremely circumscribed", *Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-*
10 *Evercoat Co.*, 812F.2d 1381 (Fed.Cir.1987), the Federal Circuit
11 has reiterated that a patentee may be denied its exemption from
12 the antitrust laws if the patentee obtained the patent by
13 knowingly and willfully misrepresenting material facts.
14 *Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.*, 141 F. 3d 1059,
15 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

16 A valid *Walker Process* fraud claim requires proof that the
17 patentee acted intentionally to deceive the government and that
18 the patent under dispute would not have been issued but for the
19 patentee's fraud. 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., *Intellectual*
20 *Property and Antitrust* § 11.2, at 11-7 at 11-7 (2003). "[T]he
21 gravamen of a *Walker Process* claim is not punishment for
22 misrepresentation, but an action to correct an anticompetitive
23 market effect resulting from the use of the patent to influence
24 the marketplace." 1 Herbert Hovenkamp et al., *Intellectual*
25 *Property and Antitrust* § 11.2, at 11-10.1 (2003).

26 A *Walker Process* fraud claim, in part, takes the material
27 omissions made in the relative obscurity of the patent
28 prosecution process and exposes them to the light of day as it

1 tests possible anti-competitive market effects resulting from
2 those material omissions. The State of California, infrequently
3 a party to patent prosecutions, has a particular concern that
4 such material omissions be afforded the most searching of factual
5 scrutiny when evaluating a *Walker Process* fraud claim. It is
6 precisely because the patent application and prosecution process
7 has historically been so impenetrable^{1/} that a *Walker Process*
8 claim is not ripe for partial summary judgment.

9 Because the public interest in fair and open competition in
10 pharmaceutical markets is so important, an antitrust claim that
11 challenges the very integrity of AZT's patent acquisition as
12 well as the integrity of the market for Glaxo-patented AZT itself
13 is also very important. As the PTO explicitly does not
14 investigate duty of disclosure issues and does not reject
15 applications on that basis, there is a great public interest in a
16 thorough factual exposition of antitrust claims based on
17 allegations of these kinds of material omissions. See United
18 States Patent and Trademark Office, *Manual of Patent Examining*
19 *Procedure* § 2001.06 (8th ed. 2001), available at
20 <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm>.

21 CONCLUSION

22 The State of California recognizes the public policy
23 determinations that underly the need for finality in the issuance
24 of a patent. A patent, once granted, enjoys a legal presumption
25

26 ¹See Federal Trade Commission, "To Promote Innovation: The Proper
27 Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy" (2003) at 7 ,
28 available at <http://www.ftc.gov> . ("Until recently, third parties
could only bring certain relevant documents to the attention of,
and, in limited circumstances, file a written protest with, an
examiner or to request the PTO Director to reexamine a patent.")

